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T

he laudatio is a tricky genre, especially when addressed to
someone of both such unfeigned modesty and sharp awareness
of literary conventions as Joan Cadden. How, then, to express
one’s appreciation and admiration? Will it embarrass Joan to read that
she is one of the most inspiring and intelligent, and one of the friendliest, most helpful, and generous scholars I know? (I hope it won’t.) And,
more important, will she believe me? (I hope she will.)
I should like to salute Joan here, especially, as a pioneer: as a female
academic who made her way in a world that was, at the time far more
so than today, dominated by men, and as the author of a highly innovative and thought-provoking book. Joan Cadden is one of the first historians who applied the question of the natural characteristics of men
and women and the construction of gender to medieval debates about
physiology, procreation, intercourse, and pleasure. In the early 1980s,
when she started the research which led up to Meanings of Sex Difference,
these were groundbreaking questions. Even more important, Joan Cadden treated them in exemplary fashion, always careful to steer clear of
anachronism, and with a keen eye for the complexities and ambiguities
of the meanings she so patiently extracted from medieval texts.
Meanings of Sex Difference draws on a very wide range of sources, crossing and re-crossing traditional boundaries between the disciplines. Joan
Cadden also pays particular attention to the cultural and social milieux
these sources were produced in; to the assumptions and expectations
of authors and readers; to questions of form, style, and presentation.1
Today, it may be easy to forget that this approach to the history of
science was, at the time, still very novel. For Joan Cadden herself, it
constituted a sharp methodological break with respect to the tradition
in which she had been trained.
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An important part of the interest of Meanings lies in Cadden’s efforts
to confront the outlook of learned physicians and natural philosophers
on sex difference with the values of the Church and the views held in
lay society at large. In doing so, Cadden is, moreover, attentive to differences in “level”: it can be quite another thing to proclaim general
principles than to take positions on specific issues. For instance, in
general terms, Christian doctrine and medical opinion considered the
chastity of men and women similarly, “religion tending to promote, and
medicine tending to oppose strict sexual restraint as an ideal.” However,
in more specific discussions, “ecclesiastical and medical views converged
with lay opinion, which placed significantly higher value upon female
virginity, abstinence, chastity, and fidelity.”2
The distinctions between “science,” “the Church,” and “lay society,”
understood as “different intellectual frameworks,” are very helpful to
capture the complexity and multilayeredness of medieval opinion about
the gender implications of sex difference. Like all categories, they are,
however, not entirely unproblematic. The distinction between science
and the Church (or religion), in particular, may not always do full justice
to the cross-disciplinary nature of scholastic thought itself.
In the medieval debate about sex difference, the Church cannot be
understood only as a source of values and norms, as an institution that
defined and enforced a sexual code. Medieval theologians and canonists
also participated actively in contemporary learned discussions about the
natural body. They did so, of course, as authors of technical works on
natural philosophy; Albertus Magnus and Giles of Rome, who wrote
highly influential treatises on zoology and embryology, are important
cases in point. However, they did so also—as recent research by Caroline Bynum, Peter Biller, Alain Boureau, Joseph Ziegler, and others has
brought to light—in strictly theological works.3 In discussions about the
state of humanity before the fall, the resurrection at the end of time, the
transmission of original sin, or the virgin birth, among other examples,
scholastic theologians routinely made use of newly translated philosophical and medical learning. In some cases, theological discussions about
physiology and the natural body are subtler and more original than those
of the physicians and philosophers themselves.4
If we are to look for “new”—or at least “more”—meanings of sex
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difference, scholastic theology and canon law may be one of the places to
turn to. As a brief continuatio to Meanings of Sex Difference, I shall chart
two doctrinal debates, which Joan Cadden studies more incidentally and
from a somewhat different angle.
The first of these debates concerns the general and fundamental
question of the origin and raison d’être of sex difference: how and why
did God create male and female bodies; or, as the issue is, revealingly,
frequently understood, for what reason, and in which manner, did he
create woman?5
One of the important points made by Cadden in her analysis of the
medieval interpretation of Genesis is that the Bible and Aristotelian natural philosophy converged, despite crucial differences— most prominently
Aristotle’s belief in the beginninglessness and eternity of the world—on
the idea of the purposefulness and perfection of the natural world.6 We
shall see that scholastic theologians integrated Aristotelian notions of
perfection and final causes into their accounts of the creation and actively
discussed their accuracy, relevancy, and compatibility with the Christian
outlook. One of my key sources is the treatise On the Human Body,
which was probably written in the late 1250s by an anonymous Franciscan
and quickly appended to Alexander of Hales’s monumental theological
Summa. Roughly based on Genesis, On the Human Body is above all an
anthropological treatise, similar, in some respects, to Augustine’s highly
influential De genesi ad litteram. It contains an exceptionally long chapter
about the body of the first woman, which later found its way, albeit in
much abbreviated form, into Thomas Aquinas’s Summa.7
The confrontation with natural philosophy was, of course, only one
of the influences that shaped scholastic views on sex difference. We
shall see that more internal factors, such as the apparent contradictions
within Genesis itself, the Augustinian heritage, and the need to take
positions with respect to Greek and Jewish interpretations, as well as
contemporary heresies, also explain how and why scholastics came to
defend a relatively moderate view on the origin of woman, sex difference,
and gender distinctions.
The second, more specific, yet partly intersecting debate I shall be
examining concerns the hermaphrodite.8 In commentaries on Genesis,
the hermaphrodite cropped up, as we shall see, because one of the
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interpretations which the scholastics rejected was the idea that the first
human had been an androgynous being. Theologians and, especially,
canonists were also interested in the hermaphrodite for more practical reasons, which reveal some of the social implications of sex difference. They asked how hermaphrodites must be baptized, whether they
should be allowed to marry—and if so, with partners of which sex?—and
whether they might be ordained as priests.
Despite the fact that medieval medicine and natural philosophy provided purely naturalistic explanations for the existence of hermaphrodites, Joan Cadden has argued that anatomically ambiguous individuals
were, even in scientific texts, often seen as rebellious and disruptive in
accordance with more widely held views in various sectors of medieval
society. There was a general tendency, she suggests, “to reduce [hermaphrodites] to permutations of the conventional categories of masculine and feminine,” which precluded any clear distinction between
various forms of sexual ambiguity. While gender paradoxes could have a
positive value in certain forms of religious language (such as the metaphor of Jesus as mother), “canonists reflecting on unusual anatomy or
behavior in ordinary people sounded more hostile.”9
The discussions about the hermaphrodite in theology and canon
law largely substantiate Joan Cadden’s analysis, yet allow us to qualify
it on some points. We shall see, in particular, that canonists generally
discussed the problem of the hermaphrodite’s access to the sacraments in
morally neutral tones. Their approach to sexual identity was, moreover,
highly pragmatic and made room for social criteria. Debates about the
specific and limiting case of the hermaphrodite can, finally, be read as
more generally indicative of the importance of sex difference and gender
distinctions. Such a reading suggests that canon law, compared to other
intellectual frameworks, was relatively egalitarian.
The Creation of Sex Difference
Genesis tells two different stories about the origin of sex difference.
According to the first (Gen. 1:27), God created man and woman as the
crown on the six-days’ work: “[He] created man in his own image, in
the image of God created he him; male and female created he them.”
The second, most familiar, account (Gen. 2:21–22) describes how God
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first fashioned man from the earth and then created paradise for him,
as well as the animals, which he placed under his command. At Adam’s
request for a companion, God made him fall asleep and fashioned woman
from his rib. After the Fall, she would be known as Eve.
The differences between these accounts had stimulated debates about
the origin of sex difference since Antiquity, among both Christians and
Jews. One of the solutions to the apparent contradictions of Genesis was
the Jewish legend of Lilith. According to this tradition, Lilith, not Eve,
was the first woman. Created from the earth, like Adam, Lilith proved
rebellious and unfaithful, demanding total equality with her husband
and eventually abandoning him for the company of demons. Faced with
Adam’s despair, God then created a second woman from his rib, in the
hope that this would make her more faithful.
It would seem that medieval theologians discovered the story of
Lilith only at the end of the twelfth century, probably through personal
contacts with Jewish informants.10 Whatever the case, scholastics never
took this particularly misogynous interpretation of Genesis very seriously and dismissed it, without much debate, as a frivolous Jewish fable.
Despite his knowledge of Hebrew and his interest in Jewish exegesis, the
Franciscan Nicholas of Lyra, author of a hugely influential commentary
on the whole Bible, did not even mention Lilith.11
However, the fundamental idea behind Lilith’s legend, i.e., that the
manner in which God created man and woman reveals his social intentions and that woman’s origin determines her relationship towards her
husband, is, as Joan Cadden has pointed out as well, also a prominent
feature of Christian exegesis. The position of medieval commentators
is more moderate, but, as so often, not without ambiguities.12 Some
claimed that God created woman from Adam’s rib, and not from the
earth, in order to stimulate his love for her.13 Others added that conjugal love is vital for the human race, since husband and wife must stay
together all their lives, and that this is why among all living beings, only
the human female is created from the male.14 By choosing to fashion
woman from Adam’s rib, rather than his head or his foot, God was taken
to show, moreover, that woman should neither dominate her husband,
nor be his servant, but, instead, a true companion.15 However, as many
theologians pointed out, the manner of creation of woman also indicates
105

that the relationship is not an equal one. Woman is created from the
man, and not the opposite, so that she be under his authority (ut ab eo
regatur) within marriage. Paul’s statements that the man is the head of
the woman (I Cor. 11.3) and that the woman has been created for the
man, and not the man for the woman (I Cor. 11.8–9) helped to buttress
this point. The story of creation thus served to affirm the natural submission (secundum conditionem naturae) of wife to husband.16
Whereas Lilith’s legend doubles the creation of the first woman,
another Jewish solution to the contradictions of Genesis doubles the
body of the first human.17 According to this interpretation that was
already signalled by Augustine, God had first created an androgynous
double being (the first creation story), which he later cut in half to create
man and woman (the second story). Apart from important philological
arguments against this interpretation, which I shall not dwell on here,
scholastics rejected it for moral and philosophical reasons not found in
their Patristic models. 18
In the 1190s, the Parisian theologian Peter the Chanter launched a
strongly anti-homosexual reading that would be taken up by several
later commentators. He argued that had the first human indeed been an
hermaphrodite, God would seem to have given homosexuals a justification for having sex with a man instead of a woman, “as if men have both
sexual organs.”19 The association between sexually ambiguous anatomy
and behavior in itself was not new. Ancient animal lore, which had found
its way into medieval bestiaries and encyclopedias, already presented
some animals, such as the hare, the hyena, and the weasel as both
homosexual and hermaphroditic (or as changing their sex regularly).20
Less frequently, it was claimed that some hermaphroditic animals, such
as the hare, could self-reproduce.21
The author of On the Human Body cited these and similar animal
legends explicitly, but confronted them with Aristotelian philosophy
and zoology. His rejection of the hypothesis of an androgynous first
human was based on the idea of the perfection of paradise and the
order of nature. At first sight, the union of male and female in one
individual, and the concomitant possibility of self-reproduction, might
seem to exemplify the Aristotelian claim that nature favors simplicity,
economy, and self-sufficiency. However, the author of On the Human
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Body doubted, like most scholastic philosophers, that hermaphrodites
could self-reproduce. More important, he noted that nature, according
to Aristotle, also respects other, more pressing, criteria of perfection,
such as the separation of active (male) and passive (female) principles.
As a mixture of male and female, the hermaphrodite incarnates disorder
(confusio), which nature abhors, rather than the perfection she seeks.
Worse, this physical condition allows for sex-role inversion, which, in
humans, the noblest of all animals, is an abomination (abusio). God created woman “to avoid that the union of the sexes in one and the same
person causes confusion, which both nature and the right judgement
of reason flee.”22 As mixtures of the active and the passive, male and
female, and unable to control their sexual capacities, hermaphrodites
violate the order of nature, which is understood both as a physical system
and a moral norm.
The confrontation with Greek exegetical traditions led scholastics
to make a more positive case in favor of sex difference and the creation
of woman. Several Greek Church Fathers had presented sex difference
as a result of sin and claimed that humanity, in its original state, had
been not androgynous, but entirely asexual. This strongly neoplatonic
reading, which goes back to Philo of Alexandria and Origen, is based on
a radical distinction between body and soul and on the idea of creation
as a progressive departure from the spiritual towards the inferior world
of material bodies. In this view, the first creation story in Genesis had
to be understood as the creation of the human soul, which is immaterial and asexual, while the second described its incorporation, leading
to the appearance of sex difference. Gregory of Nyssa, followed by John
Damascene, qualified sex difference more explicitly as a result of the
Fall. Created after God’s image, original human nature was incorporeal,
eternal, and asexual; this is the existence humans will recover after the
Resurrection. However, since God foresaw that, because of their sin,
Adam and Eve would lose their immortality, he created beforehand the
means for them to overcome death. According to Gregory of Nyssa, sex
difference existed in paradise, but already deviated from the prototype
of human nature in God’s mind. Moreover, prelapsarian bodies were
spiritual and pure in nature, allowing them to reproduce asexually, like
angels. In this view, sexuality only became useful after the Fall.
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Augustine had already firmly rejected this view of creation. Even
though he agreed that sex difference is not part of God’s image in
humanity, he held that it is all the same part and parcel of human nature
created according to Divine will. Its goal is procreation, sanctified by
marriage. For any other purpose, a male companion would, so Augustine
stated, have been preferable. Had they not sinned, Adam and Eve would
have had intercourse and would have procreated in paradise (albeit not
to guarantee the survival of the human race, but to replace the fallen
angels). Intercourse would, however, have been devoid of sin or shame,
an act as neutral as a handshake. Augustine thus took position not only
against Manicheism and extreme asceticism (by emphasizing both the
sanctity of marriage and the natural character of generation and sexual
difference), but also against Pelagianism (in defending the real consequences of the Fall).
The author of On the Human Body took up afresh this Augustinian
justification of sex difference in the light of the new Aristotelian natural
philosophy, while, at the same time, criticizing the famous Aristotelian
description of woman as a “failed man” (mas occasionatus). For, if woman
is, as suggested by Aristotle in On the Generation of Animals (II.3.737), an
error of nature, how can she be present in paradise? The author of On the
Human Body was not the first theologian to come up against Aristotle’s
expression. Thirty years earlier, William of Auvergne, master of theology
at the University of Paris, and, from 1228 on, bishop of that city, was
one of the first readers of Michael Scot’s Latin translation of Aristotle’s
zoology.23 He cited Aristotle’s qualification of womankind within a long
justification of Christian marriage based, among other arguments, on
the perfect complementarity of male and female in procreation. Even
though women’s role in generation is only passive and ancillary, both
sexes are good and praiseworthy in themselves. From this perspective,
calling woman a failed male is unacceptable (nec est audiendum Aristoteles)
and even seems to imply a justification of homosexuality.24 If a man is
allowed to have intercourse with an imperfect male, would it not follow
that he may do the same with a perfect woman, i.e., a man?
At the time when William wrote his De sacramentis, Aristotle’s books
on natural philosophy had not yet become authorative; in Paris they
were even still officially banned. This may explain William’s highly
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selective use of Aristotle, adopting, without saying so, the Aristotelian
theory of generation (which allowed him to qualify men and women as
complementary, the male being active, the female passive), while also
dismissing without qualms his definition of woman as a failed male,
even though the latter is a direct corollary of the Aristotelian theory of
generation.
The anonymous author of On the Human Body shows a more thorough understanding of what Aristotle had meant. He had called woman
a mas occasionatus because, in his view, in every specific act of generation,
nature aims for a boy. In this sense, the generation of girls is due to a
defect of the natural powers and can be assimilated to the generation of a
monster. However, Aristotle hastened to add, contrary to real monsters,
women are necessary for the perpetuation of the species and thus have
a final cause.
Even though the anonymous Franciscan accepted this analysis, he
did not fail to realize that the Aristotelian justification of the female as a
necessary error of nature led to problems when applied to the prelapsarian
state, when humankind enjoyed immortality and perfect physiology. As
shown by Peter Biller, scholastic theologians had, by 1250, started to ask
questions about the proportion of men and women in paradise had Adam
and Eve not sinned.25 They argued that letting perfect nature follow its
course, Adam and Eve would only have had boys (or at least far more boys
than girls), skewing the sex ratio and jeopardizing future procreation. In
order to conceive girls, Adam would have had to rein in his sperm by the
force of his imagination, and thus by an act of the will.26
However, if the generation of girls only comes naturally after the Fall,
in an already degenerated nature, one would seem to slip back into the
error of the Greeks, who considered sex difference as a consequence of
sin. At the time, refuting this old error may well have seemed urgent,
because the Church saw itself confronted by the heresy of the Cathars,
who rejected the body, sexuality, and the sacrament of marriage and
were particularly wary about female physiology.27 The author of On
the Human Body seems aware of this danger, because he stressed, citing
Augustine and Julian of Toledo, that the female sex is not a sin, but a
natural state (non est vitium sexus femineus, sed natura); part and parcel of
the “Truth of human nature.” After the Resurrection, our bodies will be
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perfect, and they will be male and female bodies.28 However, humankind
will, then, no longer procreate. The glorious body has a sex, but it has
no sexuality.29 With this appeal to the scholastic concept of the veritas
humanae naturae, the author of On the Human Body moved away not
only from Aristotle’s but also Augustine’s purely utilitarian justification
of sex difference, which valued woman only with respect to her role in
generation. 30 Sex difference appears here, rather, as an essential and
intrinsic trait of one and the same human nature.
The Hermaphrodite, the Sacraments, and the
Construction of Gender
Even though theologians barred the hermaphrodite from paradise, they
recognized the existence of anatomically ambiguous individuals since the
Fall. Consequently, theologians and, especially, canonists asked how the
Church should treat hermaphrodites and, more specifically, whether,
and under which circumstances, they could receive the sacraments of
baptism, marriage, and ordination. As has been pointed out by Joan
Cadden and others, medieval physicians and philosophers held that
sex difference admitted of degree, while some medical models implied
the existence of a perfect intermediary between man and woman, for
example in linking sex determination to the place occupied by the seed
in the uterus (left/right) and by assigning to the hermaphrodite a place
in the middle.31 However, from the thirteenth century on, as Aristotle’s
influence made itself increasingly felt, it was usually claimed that one
of the sexes necessarily dominated, although it might be difficult, in
practice, to establish which. Canonists and theologians also tended to
fit the hermaphrodite into a binary construct. Robert of Courson, a
student of Peter the Chanter, backed up this legal reductionism with a
reference to the opinion of the physicians.32 More commonly, canonists
and theologians recognized the existence of a pure middle term, besides
predominantly male and predominantly female hermaphrodites.
Interestingly, anatomy was, however, of relatively limited importance
as a criterion for classification. When physical appearance did play a role,
it was as much about beards, which can be seen without invasive examination, as about penises, breasts, or vaginas. Canonists seem to have viewed
the sexual identity of hermaphrodites above all as a social reality. Peter
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the Chanter signalled that the Church allowed hermaphrodites to marry
according to the sexual organ which procured the most pleasure.33 His
near contemporary, the great Bolognese canonist Huguccio, insisted not
on sexual function, but on public behavior as indicative of the underlying real sex. If hermaphrodites prefer male activities and the company
of males, the law will consider them accordingly.34 Even though gender
is not a matter of pure choice, hermaphrodites can, according to this
model, influence their assigned identity by their behavior. This approach
to gender is all the more remarkable as in a similar context, that of the
obstacles to marriage, examining the (male) genitalia is the principal
proof to determine whether the marriage has been consummated or not,
a condition of its validity.35
The hermaphrodite is hardly a staple topic in medieval canon law and
theology. Debates about the hermaphrodite’s access to the sacraments
are concentrated in a rather brief period of time, between the 1170s and
the early decades of the thirteenth century. The problem did find its
way into a popular late medieval collection of questions related to nature
and the human body.36 However, canonists and theologians seem, by
then, to have lost interest themselves. The same is true, as suggested by
Nicholas of Lyra’s commentary on Genesis, of exegetes. Nicholas based
his refutation of the idea of an androgynous first human being not on its
sexual ambiguity, but on its doubleness, citing a pair of female siamese
twins as an analogy.37
A comparison with medieval Muslim law provides another standard
against which to evaluate the scholastic debates about the hermaphrodite.
In Muslim law, the cases and contexts taken into consideration are much
more diverse, ranging from rules for pilgrimage, prayer, ritual purity,
the washing of a corpse before burial, the wearing of jewelry and silk
clothing, to cases of libel and the rules for succession.38 This greater
richness may well reflect the more fundamental importance of gender
distinctions in the societies of the Middle East. By comparison, medieval canon law tends to treat men and women equally, except in special
cases like the priesthood. For instance, while Roman law (in which the
hermaphrodite, revealingly, also plays a prominent role) refuses the
testimony of a woman for the drawing up of a will, her testimony is valid
in the ecclesiastical courts.
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For baptism, sex is of little importance, since males and females can
receive the sacrament and since the sacramental formula is the same
for both. Only the name of the child is sex-specific. Peter the Chanter
laconically recommends the use of a male name when in doubt about the
dominant sex; if necessary, its female variant may later be used for the
sacrament of confirmation. The same rule applies to emergency baptisms
during a difficult birth, when the sex of the child is still unknown.39
Despite the fact that the male name is clearly the default here, access to
baptism itself is not at issue.40 The same structural parallelism holds true
for the sacrament of marriage. Both predominantly male and predominantly female hermaphrodites may marry a partner of the sex opposite
to the hermaphrodite’s own dominant sex.
By contrast, since women cannot be priests, only predominantly male
hermaphrodites may be ordained. Canonists justified this solution by the
principle in civil law that prohibits women and female hermaphrodites,
but not male hermaphrodites, from testifying for the drawing up of a
will (Huguccio assimilates the “pure” hermaphrodite legally to a woman,
because it cannot be said that the male element dominates).41 In other
contexts, canon law refuses even the ordination of predominantly male
hermaphrodites, but this exclusion is based not on their sexual ambiguity but on their monstrosity, physical defects being, like illegitimacy or
illiteracy, an obstacle to the priesthood.42
Scholastic debates about Eve and the hermaphrodite would both seem
to reflect, in their own way, the universalism of the Christian tradition,
which downplays sexual or ethnic differences in order to celebrate the
fundamental unity of humankind. In the medieval law of the Church,
the hermaphrodite is a discrete presence, when compared to other law
systems. Likewise, On the Human Body represents the culmination of
the scholastics’ efforts to comment on the creation of woman anthropologically; later debates lack the vivacity and urgency of this treatise.43
Of course, this does not mean that theologians and canonists were indifferent to sex difference, and even less that they viewed sexual ambiguity
favorably. In commentaries on Genesis, medieval theologians based their
justification of the creation of woman to a large extent on the rejection
of physical conditions that compromised the binary division between
the sexes. In the eyes of medieval theologians, hermaphrodites’ supposed
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capacity for alternately adopting male and female roles in intercourse
likened them to homosexuals and made them the object of condemnation and indignation. In On the Human Body, hermaphroditism appeared
both as an error of and a vice against nature. That sex role inversion was
indeed the central issue is confirmed by Nicholas of Lyra, who replaced
the hermaphrodite by siamese twins. Monsters, he argued on Aristotelian lines, are “accidents” of nature and as such incompatible with the
perfection of paradise.44 The order of nature does, however, not have a
moral connotation here, and Nicholas’s tone is perfectly neutral.
While theologians, in their commentaries on the creation, condemned hermaphrodites in extremely harsh terms, canonists tended
to discuss their access to the sacraments in a remarkably neutral way,
while defending a largely constructivist and pragmatic view of gender.
However, the reversal of sexual roles in the case of remarriage shows
the limits of this relative tolerance even here. According to Peter the
Chanter, hermaphrodites had to adopt a gender and stick to it for the rest
of their lives. If they had no clear preference, they had to remain celibate
“in order to avoid any resemblance with the inversion of the sodomites,
whom God abhors.”45 Peter the Chanter is, of course, not a canonist
but a theologian, and it is surely significant that I have not found this
precise position and wording, including the reference to sodomy, among
the canonists themselves. However, according to the Glossa ordinaria,
Huguccio dismissed the question of remarriage as “monstrous.”46
The possibility of sex role inversion was perceived as a danger to
the order of nature, understood both as a physical system and a moral
code. Women’s undisputed place in this natural order was, as we have
seen, not without ambiguities. While defending the female condition
as part and parcel of the Truth of human nature, scholastic theologians
underscored that her submission to her husband was just as natural. In
fine, scholastic debates about Eve and the hermaphrodite confirm the
extreme complexity and multilayeredness of medieval meanings of sex
difference, so masterfully brought to light by Joan Cadden.
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